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Abstract. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are rapidly emerg-
ing as a root-of-trust for protecting sensitive applications and data using
hardware-backed isolated worlds of execution. TEEs provide robust as-
surances regarding critical algorithm execution, tamper-resistant creden-
tial storage, and platform integrity using remote attestation. However,
the challenge of remotely managing credentials between TEEs remains
largely unaddressed in existing literature. In this work, we present novel
protocols using mutual attestation for supporting four aspects of secure
remote credential management with TEEs: backups, updates, migration,
and revocation. The proposed protocols are agnostic to the underlying
TEE implementation and subjected to formal verification using Scyther,
which found no attacks.
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1 Introduction
Trusted computing offers robust, on-device protection of security-critical data
and the ability to securely report evidence of platform integrity, which has cul-
minated in efforts such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Until recently,
however, such technologies were relatively restricted: neither arbitrary applica-
tion execution nor secure input/output (I/O) are realisable with TPMs without
substantially increasing the hardware-software Trusted Computing Base (TCB),
say, through the use of virtual machines [11]. Trusted Execution Environments
(TEEs), discussed further in Section 2, have emerged as the forerunner for ad-
dressing these shortcomings, particularly for constrained devices [19]. Unlike
TPMs, TEEs provide hardware-enforced isolated execution of critical applica-
tions and data on the same underlying hardware. TEEs aim to thwart sophisti-
cated software adversaries from a conventional Operating System (OS) irrespec-
tive of its protection mode, e.g Rings 0–3. Modern Intel and ARM chipsets offer
Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) and ARM TrustZone respectively for
instantiating a TEE from the CPU or System-on-Chip (SoC).
Despite widespread availability, managing TEE data credentials throughout
their life-cycle has received little attention by the community. Such credentials,
whether derived from a public-key certificate, password or another value, are
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typically used to authenticate sensitive actions and transmitted data. Chal-
lenges arise, however, when credentials require migrating, revoking, updating
or backing-up in a secure and trusted manner with bi-directional assurances be-
tween both end-points. Firstly, large numbers of TEEs must be administered,
thus limiting the feasibility of human intervention, potentially over a multitude
of communication mediums. Secondly, heterogeneous TEEs must be accommo-
dated: Intel SGX, for example, is confined to Intel CPUs on more powerful de-
vices, while ARM TrustZone is limited to ARM-based SoCs. Hence, for the first
time, we address four key challenges when managing heterogeneous TEE creden-
tials over its lifetime with bi-directional trust assurances for remote migration
(Section 3), revocation (Section 4), backups (Section 5), and updates (Section 6).
This paper presents the following contributions:
– An examination of existing smart card and TPM work relating to each cre-
dential management challenge and their applicability to TEEs.
– A suite of proposed protocols for facilitating TEE credential management
with mutual attestation. The protocols are agnostic of the TEE and com-
munication medium, and employ a Trusted Service Manager (TSM) in line
with the GlobalPlatform TEE specifications [10].
– The proposed protocols are subjected to formal symbolic verification using
Scyther, which found no attacks. We publicly release the verification speci-
fications for further research1.
2 Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)
GlobalPlatform defines a TEE as an isolated execution environment that “pro-
tects from general software attacks, defines rigid safeguards as to the data and
functions a program can access, and resists a set of defined threats” [9]. TEEs
aim to isolate applications from integrity and confidentiality attacks from the un-
trusted OS, e.g. Android, or Rich Execution Environment (REE), by allocating
distinct memory regions with accesses controlled by hardware. We summarise
the foremost commercial TEEs for Intel and ARM chipsets; the reader is referred
to [22] for a detailed survey of secure and trusted execution environments.
Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is an extension to the x86-64
instruction set that enables the creation of per-application ‘enclaves’. Enclaves
reside in isolated memory regions within RAM with accesses mediated by the
CPU, which is considered trusted [6]. Secure storage is provided via the sealing
abstraction, where data is encrypted to the untrusted world using a key derived
from a processor-specific Storage Root Key (SRK). Enclave- or author-specific
keys can be derived; that is, respectively, binding data to only that enclave,
or from an ID string to preserve persistence between enclaves from the same
author. Remote attestation enables remote verification of enclaves and secret
provisioning using the Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) scheme [4], which authen-
ticates enclave integrity measurements without revealing the CPU’s identity.
1 Available online at: https://cs.gl/extra/wistp18-scripts.zip
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Fig. 1. GlobalPlatform TEE system architecture [22].
GlobalPlatform (GP) TEE with ARM TrustZone maintains two worlds
for all trusted and untrusted applications. A TEE kernel is used for scheduling,
memory management, cryptographic methods and other OS functions, while
user-mode TEE Trusted Applications (TAs) access OS functions exposed by the
GP TEE Internal API. The GP TEE Client API [9] defines the interfaces for
communicating with TAs from the REE. The predominant method for instanti-
ating the GP TEE is with ARM TrustZone, which enables two isolated worlds
to co-exist in hardware using two virtual cores for each world per physical CPU
core and an extra CPU bit (NS bit) for distinguishing REE/TEE execution
modes. TrustZone provides secure I/O with peripherals connected over standard
interfaces, e.g. SPI and GPIO, by routing interrupts to the TEE kernel using the
TrustZone Protection Controller (TZPC) for securing on-chip peripherals from
the REE, and the Address Space Controller (TZASC) for memory-mapped de-
vices. Both TZASC and TZPC utilise the NS bit for access control. The GP TEE
implements secure storage using the sealing abstraction described previously, or
to TEE-controlled hardware, e.g. Secure Element (SE).
Credential Management. Security credentials are the evidence that a com-
municating party possesses for accessing privileged data and services. Credentials
are typically programmed initially into a TEE during the personalisation phase
following the procurement of the SoC and TEE software, but prior to deploy-
ment. After this, a Trusted Service Manager (TSM) – incorporated into the
device manufacturer or outsourced – is responsible for maintaining the TEE, its
TAs and on-board credentials thereafter. We define TEE credentials as the set,
C, of key material, certificates and other authentication data issued by TSM
that is provisioned into a TA. TEE credentials may also comprise a key derived
from a password-based key derivation function using a password from an oper-
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ator, or encapsulated by biometrics, e.g. iris and fingerprint, or a behavioural
model that maps device continuous data to authentication states [21].
2.1 Credential Management: Security and Functional Requirements
The GP Trusted Management Framework (TMF) does not stipulate particular
secure channel protocols, but only that the TSM and TEE should mutually au-
thenticate over a channel that preserves the “integrity and the confidentiality of
the exchanges,” and addresses replay attacks against a Dolev-Yao adversary [10].
These basic requirements omit desirable features identified in existing litera-
ture [2, 12, 20], such as assurances that the target TEE is authentic and integral.
This is typically realised using Remote Attestation (RAtt) where, firstly, system
measurements are taken at boot-time or on-demand, which are collected and
signed by a trusted measurer under a device-specific key; RAtt protocols subse-
quently transmit the measurements over a secure channel to a remote verifier,
who evaluates the platform’s integrity based on these values.
In sensitive deployments, mutually authenticating both end-points is useful
during TEE-to-TEE communication; for example, between uploading backups
from a GP TEE to a cloud-based backup enclave using Intel SGX. Here, RAtt
protocols can be conducted independently for each end-point, or using a mu-
tual attestation protocol wherein both parties are attested in a single protocol
instance. We refer to such mutual attestation protocols, e.g. [20], as providing a
Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol (STCP) in this work. We now formalise
the baseline security and functional requirements from issues raised in related
work and those stipulated in the GlobalPlatform specifications:
S1) Mutual key establishment : a shared secret key is established for communica-
tion between the two entities.
S2) Forward secrecy : the compromise of a particular session key should not affect
past or subsequent protocol runs.
S3) Trust assurance: the proposal shall allow third-parties to verify the target
platform’s integrity prior to credential transmission.
S4) Mutual trust verification: both end-points shall successfully attest the state
of the other before permitting the establishment of a secure channel.
S5) Mutual entity authentication: each communicating end-point shall authenti-
cate the other’s identity to counter masquerading attempts.
S6) Denial of Service (DoS) resilience: resource allocation shall be minimised at
both end-points to prevent DoS conditions from arising.
S7) Key freshness: the shared key shall be fresh to the session in order to prevent
replay attacks.
F1) Avoidance of additional trust hardware: the protocol shall avoid the need for
additional security hardware, e.g. TPMs and SEs, other than the TEE.
F2) TEE agnosticism: the protocols shall remain agnostic of the underlying TEE
architecture to facilitate interoperability.
Setup Assumptions. A public-key infrastructure is assumed in which a
Certificate Authority (CA) issues certificates to the TSM, TAs, and backup
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(BA), revocation (RA) and maintenance (MA) authorities used for managing
backups, revoking credentials and physically maintaining devices respectively.
The TEEs themselves are assumed to be trusted and to possess certified, device-
specific attestation and command keys for signing quotes and requests to the
TSM. Quotes are a widely-used remote attestation abstraction for TPMs and
TEEs, comprising the TEE’s identity and the platform integrity measurements
collected by a TEE-resident trusted measurer. The resulting quote is signed
using the attestation key and transmitted to the remote verifying authority. The
credentials are assumed to be securely stored within the TEE, usually performed
by encrypting them under a device-specific SRK, as well as secure means of
random number generation and key derivation.
3 Migration
TEE migration is the process of transferring and re-provisioning credential data
from TAA to TAB in distinct TEEs. Migration is crucial in preserving creden-
tials during a device replacement or relocation, where credentials can be remotely
transferred without incurring reinitialisation costs. Migrating credentials across
TEEs has already attracted some attention in related literature [3, 16]. We sum-
marise these schemes and their contributions.
Arfaoui et al. [3] tackle the challenge of credential migration on GlobalPlat-
form TEEs. The authors introduce a trusted TEE Admin, which possesses a
Security Domain (SD) with a TA and key-pair on the source device, to mediate
and authenticate the authorisation and migration procedures. Two PKI-based
protocols are developed for performing the migration between the target TA and
the service provider’s TA. Both protocols are subjected to formal verification us-
ing the AVISPA analysis tool. While the authors note the importance of remote
attestation to verify the target TEE, it is not presented or verified as part of
the protocol; it is also omitted during the credential transfer process between
the TEEs. Moreover, mutual trust assurances between the service provider and
TEE is not discussed.
Kostiainen et al. [16] tackle migration for TEE open credential platforms
where service providers can provision arbitrary credentials, say, for virtualised
access control cards. The authors propose encrypting and backing-up credentials
on a trusted server using a tokenised password known only to the user. The
credentials are migrated by re-entering the password, which is re-tokenised on the
receiver device, and transmitted and verified by the backup server that releases
the encrypted credentials. However, like [3], the proposal lacks trust assurances
between the TSM and both TEEs, nor is it subjected to formal analysis.
3.1 Proposed High-level Migration Procedure
Credentials must be deleted on the device from which they are migrated, while
transferring them over a secure channel with mutual trust assumptions. In Figure
2, we show how migration can be performed between remote TAs accounting for
the shortcomings in related work, which comprises the following messages:
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TAA REEA TSM REEB TAB
1. STCP
2. Initiate Migration
3. Prepare C 4. Ack.
5. STCP
6. Prepare Migration from TAA
7. Ack.
8. ID of TAB
9. STCP
10. Transfer C
11. Provision C12. Ack.
13. Success
14. Delete Credentials
15. Delete C 16. Success
Fig. 2. Proposed TEE credential migration procedure.
1. A mutual remote attestation protocol [2, 12, 20] is executed between TSM
and TAA to bootstrap a secure and mutually trusted channel (STCP).
2. TSM transmits the begin migration command to TAA.
3. TAA unseals credentials, C, from its secure storage for transmission.
4. TAA acknowledges to TSM that the credentials were unsealed successfully.
5. A separate STCP instance is executed between (TSM,TAB).
6. TSM instructs TAB to prepare for credential provisioning.
7. TAB acknowledges to TSM that it is ready to receive credentials.
8. TSM transmits the ID of TAB to TAA, e.g. IP address, to which to transmit
the unsealed credentials.
9. An STCP is formed using mutual remote attestation between TAA and TAB .
10. The credential transfer occurs between TAA and TAB .
11. The transferred credential is provisioned into the secure storage of TAB .
12–13. TAB acknowledges its provisioning success to TAA and TSM .
14. TSM instructs TAA to delete its migrated credential(s).
15–16. TAA deletes C and acknowledges its success to TSM .
The high-level procedure uses three STCPs with mutual attestation between
(TSM,TAA), (TSM,TAB) and (TAA, TAB), thus addressing the absence of bi-
directional trust assurances in existing work. The proposal avoids unnecessarily
exposing credentials to the TSM by transmitting data directly between the mu-
tually authenticated TAs. Implicitly, the protocol avoids specifying TEE-specific
functionalities; rather, for F2 (TEE agnosticism), we abstract the protocol ap-
propriately to allow migrations between heterogeneous TEEs by allowing either
a GP TEE application or Intel SGX enclave to act as either TA. For TEE-
specific implementation guidance, the reader is referred to existing work such as
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the GlobalPlatform TMF specifications [10], and the work by Arfaoui et al. [3]
for managing and authorising SDs on the GP TEE. In Section 7, we specify the
protocols and procedures formally, and detail an enhanced mutual attestation
protocol for STCP for satisfying the remaining requirements from Section 2.1.
4 Revocation
Credentials are typically revoked when they reach the end of their predefined
lifespan as part of a key rotation policy; if the OEM discovers a vulnerability
in the TA or TEE kernel code, and the credentials were potentially compro-
mised; or the device is retired from service, say, due to obsolescence. Revoca-
tion has attracted much attention in related TPM and smart card literature.
Chen and Li [5] address credential revocation in TPM 2.0 Direct Anonymous
Attestation (DAA). Like conventional group signatures, DAA allows the signer
to demonstrate knowledge of its individual private key corresponding to the
group’s public key; however, this complicates revocation because the signer’s
identity is not revealed, even to the group manager. The authors review two
solutions: rekey-based, where the issuer regularly updates its public key (which
may or may not include its corresponding secret key), allowing only legitimate
non-revoked signers to update their credentials accordingly; and Verifier-Local
Revocation (VLR), where the verifier inputs a revocation list (RL), to the DAA’s
verification function and accepts only signatures from signers S /∈ RL.
Lueks et al. [18] address revoking attribute-based credentials (ABCs) for
smart cards anonymously. Here, the RA possesses an RL of anonymous revoca-
tion values, gr,v, submitted by the user or verifier (user- and system-instantiated
revocation), where r is the revocation value in the user’s credential. A revocation
‘epoch’, , corresponding to a time period, is used to provide unlinkability by
re-computing and re-sending the new valid RLs to the verifiers at each epoch;
that is, RL,V = sort({gr,V | r ∈MRL}), where MRL is the master revocation
list. Using bloom filters, this occupies only 4–8MB for 221 revoked credentials
depending on the chosen probability tolerance.
Katzenbeisser et al. [15] propose revocation for TPM 1.2 using blacklisting
and whitelisting. For blacklisting, a list of revoked keys, BL, is ordered into a
hash chain and encrypted under the TPM’s Storage Root Key (SRK); the final
hash chain value is stored in a TPM register to maintain integrity. Before loading
a key, k′, each ki ∈ BL is fed sequentially into the TPM, where it is decrypted,
and k′ ?= ki is tested. Whitelisting incrementally creates keyed hashes of each
permitted key under the TPM’s SRK and internal secure counter representing
the whitelist’s ‘version’. A key is valid iff the keyed hash counter value matches
the TPM’s internal counter. Revocation is performed by incrementing the TPM’s
counter and updating all non-revoked hashes with the new value.
4.1 Proposed High-level Revocation Procedure
Privacy-preserving credential schemes, e.g. DAA and anonymous credentials, are
beneficial in verifying credentials without divulging or linking users’ identities.
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However, to serve as an initial baseline, we scope the focus of this work is scoped
to centralised deployments for applications where the concern of violating cre-
dential privacy has far fewer consequences than government electronic ID cards
or TPMs on consumer devices. As such, we consider Industrial IoT (IIoT), lo-
gistics, and public devices in smart cities to serve as three potential application
domains. Relaxing this constraint provides us with headway to pursue simpler,
PKI-based solutions as a first step for providing TEE credential revocation with
mutual attestation. We suggest two approaches for blacklisting and whitelisting
using a trusted RA, the procedure for which illustrated in Figure 3 and described
as follows:
1. TSM and TA form a STCP using mutual remote attestation to verify each
platforms’ integrity and bootstrap a secure channel.
2–3. TSM instructs TA to reveal the current credentials in use, C, which are
then unsealed from storage, e.g. encrypted in untrusted storage or an SE.
4. C is transmitted to the TSM over the STCP by TA.
5. The TSM forms a STCP with the revocation authority, RA, who maintains
the master revocation list of white- or blacklisted credentials.
6–8. TSM submits C to RA, who returns a list of the revoked credentials in C,
i.e. RC ⊆ C, from its master revocation list (MRL).
9–11. TSM instructs TA to revoke RC internally; TA performs the deletion and
acknowledges its success.
TA REE TSM RA MA
A. STCP
B. Add Revoked Creds.
C. Success
D. Report Attempts
E. Ack.
1. STCP
2. Reveal C
3. Unseal C 4. Show C
5. STCP
6. Lookup C
7. Revoked RC
8. Ack.
9. Revoke RC
10. Update
RC ∈ C 11. Success
Fig. 3. Proposed credential revocation. Steps A–E are independent of 1–11.
Note that a malicious device may purposefully fail to update the status of
RC internally and attempt to reuse revoked credentials. Consequently, the use
of revoked credentials should be reported to MA responsible for decommission-
ing compromised devices, a simple protocol for which is listed in Steps A–E in
Figure 3 based on mutual attestation involving (MA,RA). Like [18], delegating
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revocation list management to RA removes the burden of potentially multiple
verifiers synchronising a single list; the TSM can submit a lookup request to the
RA, who queries the blacklist or whitelist in O(1) using an associative array.
Either black- or whitelisting can be performed in this model. For blacklisting,
the RA maintains a master revocation list (MRL) of revoked credentials that
should not be used in any transaction in which the MA submits credentials it
wishes to revoke to RA (maintainer-instantiated revocation). Here, RA tests the
revocation status of C by verifying C /∈ MRL. Whitelisting, conversely, com-
prises a list of only the permitted credentials; a credential is revoked by removing
it from the whitelist and, if applicable, updating the list with its replacement.
Revocation is tested by verifying C ∈MRL.
5 Remote Backups
Backup is the process of securely retrieving the set of credentials, C, belonging
to a TA for remote storage. In standard practice, backups underpin disaster
recovery plans – as stipulated by ISO 27001:2013 [14] – for recovering data
from corruption and accidental deletion. Backups may also constitute part of
a data retention policy, where device data is used as evidence of regulatory
adherence. Secure backup is beneficial when the original credential has non-
trivial reinitialisation costs. Next, we examine related work in the backup of
remote credentials aboard secure and trusted execution technologies.
Kostiainen et al. [17] address TEE credential backup, restoration and dis-
abling on consumer mobile phones, proposing two solutions. The first uses a SE
– a SIM card – in which the TEE credentials are protected under a SIM-specific
key provisioned by its provider. This allows the user to uninstall a familiar hard-
ware element, i.e. the SIM, before releasing the device for repairs or to lend to an
untrusted user. On reinserting the SIM, an on-board TEE credential manager is
used to decrypt and re-initialise the encrypted credentials. The second solution
involves the use of a removable microcontroller to counter an honest-but-curious
remote server, RS. RS possesses a shared key Ks with the TEE, and stores the
backups using a secure counter for rollback protection. To prevent RS reading
the credentials, the TEE encrypts them under a separate key, K, derived from
a local counter on the microcontroller, and re-encrypts them under Ks.
Akram et al. [1] examine credential restoration for multi-application smart
cards on smartphone SEs. The SE’s Trusted Environment and Execution Man-
ager (TEM), which dynamically enforces the smart card’s run-time security poli-
cies, is expanded to facilitate credential backups and restoration. A Backup and
Restoration Manager (BRM) is added to the smart card software stack that in-
terfaces with a TEM-resident backup token handler, which stores tokens issued
by application service providers. The user first registers the BRM with a backup
server (BS) and, when the user wishes to perform the backup, the BRM encrypts
the token(s) and communicates them to BS. To restore data, such as to a new
card, the user provides the BRM with his/her BS credentials to download the
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backed-up tokens. A secure channel is formed and the token(s) authenticate the
credential restoration from the service provider(s).
5.1 Proposed High-level Backup Procedure
We introduce a trusted Backup Authority (BA) responsible for storing retrieved
credentials. This may be a cloud-based storage provider or Hardware Security
Module (HSM) possessed by the credential issuing authority; the precise means
by which BA securely stores credentials is out-of-scope in this work. Importantly,
we note that credential restoration can be performed by executing the proposed
Remote Update procedure in Section 6. The proposed procedure between the
target TA and BA is shown in Figure 4, which is described as follows:
1-4. TSM and BA establish a secure and trusted channel with mutual attesta-
tion, and TSM requests BA to prepare for backup.
5-6. TSM forms an STCP with TA and commands it prepare the credentials for
remote backup; TSM also provides the identity of BA.
7-8. TA unseals the credentials to transmit to BA, and notifies TSM that they
were unsealed successfully.
9-12. TA and BA form a STCP over which C is transmitted to and stored securely
by BA. While TSM is considered trusted, a direct connection between TA
and BA mitigates the risk of unnecessary credential exposure to TSM .
13. BA notifies TSM that C from TA was backed-up successfully.
TA REE TSM BA
1. STCP
2. Backup Request
3. Prepare4. Ack.
5. STCP
6. Prepare Backup to BA
7. Unseal C 8. Ack.
9. STCP
10. Transmit C
11. Store C12. Ack.
13. Success
Fig. 4. Proposed high-level remote credential backup protocol.
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6 Remote Updates
Remotely updating credentials is beneficial during routine renewal schedules;
for example, with X.509 certificates that reach their validity expiry date, or
the device is relocated and the organisational unit to which the credential is
issued is no longer valid. Generally speaking, update is the process by which an
outdated credential, ci, is securely replaced by a freshly issued c
′
i. Once replaced,
ci should be revoked to prevent reusing obsolete credentials. Little work has been
conducted regarding TEE credential updates, which is likely due to the simplicity
of a TSM transmitting a new credential over a secure channel or, indeed, the
similarity with backup restoration (Section 5). Updates can be considered a
variation of backup restoration where c′i is retrieved from an update server;
the addition is revoking ci, achievable using the revocation process proposed in
Section 4. Next, we describe how this can be achieved with mutual attestation.
6.1 Proposed High-level Update Procedure
We reintroduce the maintenance authority (MA) from Section 4, which issues
credential updates as part of a standard rotation policy. If desired, the MA is
also responsible for registering obsolete credentials with the revocation authority.
The high-level update mechanism is as follows:
TA REE TSM MA RA
1. STCP
2. Update Ready
3. Ack.
4. STCP
5. Update Ready
6. Prepare
and Lock TA 7. Ack.
8. STCP
9. Fetch Credential Update
10. Transmit New Credential c
′
i
11. Seal c
′
i
and Unlock 12. Ack.
13. STCP
14. Revoke ci
15. Ack.
16. Success
Fig. 5. Proposed credential update procedure.
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1. MA, who provides the updated credentials, establishes an STCP with TSM .
2–3. MA notifies the TSM of an updated credential. This may include identities
of which TEEs need updated or all TEEs.
4–5. An STCP is conducted between (TSM,TA) and an update preparation com-
mand is transmitted to TA, along with an optional ID of MA from whom
to retrieve the update.
6. TA is locked, i.e. prevented from interacting with the REE, until the update
is performed in order to prevent the use of outdated credentials.
7. TA acknowledges to TSM that it is ready to update.
8–10. TA establishes a STCP with MA to receive the credential update; MA
transmits the updated credential, c′i, to TA.
11–12. TA seals c′i to its secure storage for future use; ci should be deleted internally
before unlocking. TA acknowledges that c′i was initialised successfully.
13–16. (MA,RA) use an STCP to white- or blacklist the obsolete credential, ci.
Lastly, MA acknowledges completion of the update procedure to TSM .
7 Proposed Protocol Analysis
We now formalise the protocols from the high-level procedures presented pre-
viously, which are listed in Protocols 1 to 6 using the notation from Table 1.
In Section 2.1, we outlined the requirements and assumptions of the protocols,
which are referred to throughout. Each proposed protocol is underpinned by
an enhancement of the BTP mutual attestation protocol in [20] for establishing
the STCP between the TEEs. This protocol (Protocol 6), which establishes a
TEE-to-TEE secure channel after exchanging and verifying attestation quotes,
is simplified to support authenticated encryption (AE), e.g. AES in GCM mode,
rather than a non-AE symmetric scheme with an additional HMAC as in orig-
inal proposal. This simplification is aimed at reducing protocol implementation
complexity and improving performance based on existing benchmarks [13]. The
protocol is based on ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key agreement that achieves ses-
sion forward secrecy (S2), mutual key establishment (S1) and key freshness (S7).
Moreover, TEE quotes are mutually exchanged for verifying the integrity of each
platform, thus satisfying S3 and S4 (mutual trust verification). The signed at-
testation values, command instructions, e.g. Prep Backup and Revoke Success,
and the shared secret provides mutual entity authentication (S5).
Crucially, the protocols avoid the use of additional trusted hardware, such
as TPMs, secure elements and smart cards (F1). The protocols are designed
to incorporate abstract TAs, which are verified using the quoting abstraction,
whether they be Intel SGX enclaves of GP TEE TAs, thus providing TEE ag-
nosticism (F2). Note, however, that this abstracts away the precision of related
work, e.g. Arfaoui et al. [3], which addresses migration specifically in the con-
text of the GP TEE. Such work incorporates GP TEE-specific entites, such as
security domains (SDs) and root SDs, which do not exist on Intel SGX or earlier
TPM-based TEEs like Intel TXT [11]. As such, users of this work should be
aware of the implementation specifics when deploying these protocols; we refer
users to [3] and [10] for guidance for GP TEEs, and [6] for Intel SGX.
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Protocol 1 Proposed Migration Procedure with BTP (MPBT)
1: Execute BTP (TSM , TA1)
2: TSM → TA1 : [(Init Migrate || XTSM )σTSM ]AEK
3: TA1 → TSM : [(TA1 Ack || XTA1)σTA1]AEK
4: Execute BTP (TSM , TA2)
5: TSM → TA2 : [(Prep Migrate || X ′TSM )σTSM ]AEK′
6: TA2 → TSM : [(TA2 Ack || X ′TA2)σTA2]AEK′
7: TSM → TA1 : [(IDTA2 || XTSM )σTSM ]AEK
8: Execute BTP (TA1, TA2)
9: TA1 → TA2 : [(C || X ′′TA1)σTA1]AEK′′
10: TA2 → TA1 : [(TA2 Ack || X ′′TA2)σTA2]AEK′′
11: TA2 → TSM : [(TA2 Done || X ′TA2)σTA2]AEK′
12: TSM → TA1 : [(Delete Creds || XTSM )σTSM ]AEK
13: TA1 → TSM : [(TA1 Success || XTA1)σTA1]AEK
Protocol 2 Proposed Revocation Lookup with BTP (RLBT)
1: Execute BTP (TSM , TA)
2: TSM → TA : [(Reveal Creds || XTSM )σTSM ]AEK
3: TA→ TSM : [(C || XTA)σTA]AEK
4: Execute BTP (TSM , RA)
5: TSM → RA : [(Lookup || C || X ′TSM )σTSM ]AEK′
6: RA→ TSM : [(Revoked || RC || X ′RA)σRA]AEK′
7: TSM → RA : [(TSM Ack || X ′TSM )σTSM ]AEK′
If RC 6= ∅:
8: TSM → TA : [(Revoke || RC || XTSM )σTSM ]AEK
9: TA→ TSM : [(Revoke Success || XTA)σTA]AEK
Protocol 3 Proposed Revocation Procedure with BTP (RPBT)
1: Execute BTP (MA, RA)
2: MA→ RA : [(Revoke || C || XMA)σMA]AEK
3: RA→MA : [(Revoke Success || XRA)σRA]AEK
4: If reported credentials (RepC 6= ∅):
RA→MA : [(Report || RepC || XRA)σRA]AEK
MA→ RA : [(Report Success || XMA)σMA]AEK
Protocol 4 Proposed Backup Procedure with BTP (BPBT)
1: Execute BTP (TSM , BA)
2: TSM → BA : [(Prep Backup || XTSM )σTSM ]AEK
3: BA→ TSM : [(BA Ack || XBA)σBA]AEK
4: Execute BTP (TSM , TA)
5: TSM → TA : [(Prep Backup || IDBA || X ′TSM )σTSM ]AEK′
6: TA→ TSM : [(TA Ack || X ′TA)σTA]AEK′
7: Execute BTP (TA, BA)
8: TA→ BA : [(C || X ′′TA)σTA]AEK′′
9: BA→ TA : [(Backup Ack || X ′′BA)σBA]AEK′′
10: BA→ TSM : [(Backup Success || XBA)σBA]AEK
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Protocol 5 Proposed Update Procedure with BTP (UPBT)
1: Execute BTP (MA, TSM)
2: MA→ TSM : [(Update Ready || XMA)σMA]AEK
3: TSM →MA : [(TSM Ack || XTSM )σTSM ]AEK
4: Execute BTP (TSM , TA)
5: TSM → TA : [(Prep Update || X ′TSM )σTSM ]AEK′
6: TA→ TSM : [(TA Ack || X ′TA)σTA]AEK′
7: Execute BTP (TA, MA)
8: TA→MA : [(Fetch Update || X ′′TA)σTA]AEK′′
9: MA→ TA : [(c′i || X ′′MA)σMA]AEK′′
10: TA→MA : [(New Cred Ack || X ′′TA)σTA]AEK′′
11: Execute BTP (MA, RA)
12: MA→ RA : [(Revoke || ci || X ′′′MA)σMA]AEK′′′
13: RA→MA : [(Revoke Success || X ′′′RA)σRA]AEK′′′
14: MA→ TSM : [(Update Success || XMA)σMA]AEK
Protocol 6 Adapted Bi-directional Trust Protocol (BTP) from [20]
1: A→ B : IDA || IDB || nA || gA || ARB
2: B → A : IDB || IDA || nB || gB ||
[
(XB)σB || (VB)σB
]
AEK
|| ARA
XB = H(IDA || IDB || gA || gB || nA || nB)
VB = QB || nB || nA
3: A→ B : [ (XA)σA || (VA)σA ]AEK
XA = H(IDA || IDB || gA || gB || nA || nB)
VA = QA || nA || nB
Table 1. Protocol notation.
Notation Description
TSM TEE trusted service manager.
BA Credential backup authority.
MA Device maintenance authority.
RA Revocation authority.
TAX TEE trusted application on device X.
nX Secure random nonce generated by X.
H(D) Secure one-way hash function, H, on D.
X → Y Message transmission from X to Y .
IDX Identity of X.
A || B Concatenation of A and B.
gX Diffie-Hellman exponentiation of X.
ARX Attestation request on target entity X.
QX Attestation quote from TEE X.
(A)σX
Signed message A from X under a private-
public key-pair (K,P ).
[m]AEK
Message m is encrypted using authenticated
encryption under session key K derived from
the protocol’s shared secret.
D′ Data specific to a separate session to D.
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Formal Symbolic Verification. Scyther by Cremers [7] was employed to
verify the correctness of the proposed protocols. A protocol is first specified
in the Scyther description language, comprising communicating parties (roles),
messages and the desired security properties (claims). Scyther verifies whether
the protocol specification satisfies those claims under the ‘perfect cryptography’
assumption, whereby an adversary learns nothing from an encrypted message un-
less the decryption key is known, against all possible behaviours of a Dolev-Yao
adversary. Despite the challenge of security protocol verification being undecid-
able in general, many practical protocols can be proven correct; notably, Scyther
has been used to verify IKEv1 and IKEv2, and the ISO/IEC 9798 authentication
protocol family [8]. We analyse all protocols using Scyther, testing for the secrecy
of transmitted quotes from both parties, e.g. (Secret, qta1) and credentials
(Secret, c); aliveness (Alive); replay protection, i.e. non-injective agreement
(Niagree) and non-injective synchronisation, (Nisynch), defined in [7]; session
key secrecy (SKR, K); and the reachability of all entities, e.g. (Reachable, TA).
We publicly release the protocol specifications for future research by the com-
munity (see Section 1). Scyther found no attacks on any protocol.
8 Conclusion
TEEs are emerging as a flexible mechanism for providing a range of assurances
regarding the on-device protection of security-critical applications, credentials
and related data. In this work, we presented a suite of proposals for remote TEE
credential management using mutual attestation for secure migration, revocation,
backups, and updates. After summarising the features of leading TEE implemen-
tations, we formalised the threat model, requirements and assumptions for a
typical TEE credential deployment in a centralised setting. Next, we reviewed
the state-of-the-art for each credential management challenge, before proposing
procedures and protocols for securely realising these notions. The protocols were
formalised and subjected to symbolic verification using Scyther, which found no
attacks under the Dolev-Yao adversarial model; the protocol specifications are
also published publicly for further research. In future work, we aim to incorpo-
rate privacy-preserving attestation into our protocol suite, which we considered
out-of-scope in this work for centralised deployments, through the use of tech-
niques like DAA and Blacklistable Anonymous Credentials (BLACs). We also
wish to address decentralised deployments, where devices have intermittent or
potentially no access to a centralised TSM.
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